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Ten Years of the Barcelona Process:  
Economic and Social Developments since 19951 
 
 
• So far, progress in achieving the economic objective of the Barcelona Process has been 
mixed. Although some economic successes as well as improvements of overall life 
quality could be achieved since 1995, progress towards “the creation of a Euro-
Mediterranean area of shared prosperity” has been moderate.  
 
• On the positive side, Mediterranean countries’ global trade integration has made some 
progress since 1995, providing benefits to the population and higher competitive 
pressure on enterprises. Mediterranean countries’ trade growth was above the world 
average for the past years, allowing for an increase of their market share in global 
trade. 
 
• Furthermore, most countries have achieved a relatively high degree of macroeconomic 
stability since 1995, a necessary though not sufficient condition for growth. Notably, the 
average inflation rate fell from around 12% in 1995 to around 3% in 2003 and 2004. 
Progress in fiscal consolidation was more modest.   
 
• However, despite these successes, the catching-up process in income levels between the 
Mediterranean region and the EU has not sufficiently advanced since 1995.2 Although 
the average income level of Mediterranean countries increased by around 35% since 
1995 it remained at around 18% in PPP terms compared to the EU income level.  
 
• The slow pace of structural reforms may explain why the overall economic 
performance has been somewhat unsatisfactory. At the same time, it must be 
recognized that the Barcelona process focused to a large extent on tariff reduction and 
has not provided a sufficiently strong set of incentives for structural reform.   
 
• By complementing and building on Barcelona, the new European Neighbourhood 
Policy has the potential to address this structural reform deficit, by focusing also on 
beyond-the-border reforms.   
 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
The year 2005 marks the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, which initiated the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (also known as the Barcelona Process). The 1995 Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Barcelona had the vision of “turning the 
Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, 
stability and prosperity”. The Barcelona process was conceived as resting on three pillars: a 
political and security partnership, an economic and financial partnership, and a social, human 
and cultural partnership. More specifically, the second pillar is dedicated to the creation of an 
area of shared prosperity with a focus on improving living conditions, accelerating the pace of 
                                                 
1 This article was prepared by Michaela Dodini and Gerhard Krause. 
2 The terms Mediterranean countries or Mediterranean region in this paper refer, if not stated otherwise, to the 
Mediterranean countries participating in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. These are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and West Bank and Gaza. Although the term West Bank and Gaza is used 
on an equal footing with other country names, West Bank and Gaza has the status of a "territory". Turkey, which is a 
recognised EU candidate, and Cyprus and Malta, which are new Member States, are not covered in this paper. 
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socio-economic development and reducing the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean 
region. 
 
This article aims at assessing progress towards the objectives of the second Barcelona pillar, i.e. 
the creation of an area of shared prosperity. To that end it analyses and assesses the evolution of 
a number of indicators (e.g. prosperity, living conditions, employment and social conditions such 
as education, health and gender for the EU Mediterranean partners during the period 1995 – 
2004). In the third part, the article examines improvements with regard to preconditions for a 
growth-conducive environment since 1995, such as regional macroeconomic stabilisation, 
Mediterranean countries’ integration into the global economy (at-the-border-reforms) and overall 
structural reform progress (beyond-the-border reforms).3 The annex contains a brief description 
of the Barcelona process and EU instruments to promote reforms in the region. 
 
 
2.   Progress on the way towards an area of shared prosperity 
 
Prosperity 
 
Overall, the Mediterranean region hardly caught up at all in terms of income level per capita with 
the EU in the period 1995-2000. Average GDP per capita in PPP terms for the Mediterranean 
region was USD 3750 in 1995 and increased to around USD 5000 in 2004. However, the 
prosperity gap did not close at all in this period as the Mediterranean income level in relation to 
the EU income level remained at around 18% (Chart 1). Since 1994, a marked positive 
convergence could be noted only for Tunisia, whose relative income level advanced by four 
percentage points to 26.8% of the EU level in 2004. For most other countries average per capita 
income growth lagged behind the EU’s per capita growth rate, leading – in particular in Israel, 
Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza – to a divergence from EU per capita income levels.  
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In most Mediterranean countries, the relatively (though below potential) good growth 
performance of the 1990s did not translate into a significant increase in per capita income levels, 
                                                 
3 The article of A. Baecker in this publication (page 24) provides more details on progress in trade liberalisation, 
while the article of F. Hansen (page 52) assess a key aspect of the beyond-the border reform agenda, namely 
Mediterranean countries business environment.  
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relatively large population increases. Since the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, Mediterranean 
countries have had average growth of 3.9% per year compared to an EU average of 2.2% per 
year. This needs to be considered against the background of relatively high population and 
labour force growth rates at 2.1% and 3.0% on average per year respectively, in the same period. 
Consequently, the income gap for all Mediterranean countries even with the EU countries with 
the lowest income per capita (Greece and Portugal) remains high, with the notable exception of 
Israel, whose income level corresponds to 74% of the EU average level in 2004 (PPP terms). 
 
Macroeconomic stabilisation efforts, some progress in structural reforms and more favourable 
commodity prices lifted the average growth rate above 5% in the period 1994-96, and GDP 
growth remained comfortably above the 3% level until the end of the decade. In 2001-02, the 
average regional growth rate declined sharply to below 2% due to the economic slowdown in the 
EU and the US, the impact of September 11th (tourism, investment), country-specific shocks 
(e.g. droughts) and a worsened security situation in the Middle East. In 2003-04 economic 
growth strengthened to above 3%, albeit with wide differences within the Mediterranean region, 
thanks in particular to a more conducive global environment and higher oil prices (Chart 2). 
 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Maghreb Mashrek
Israel MED Countries
Source: IFS, national Statistical Offices.
Chart 2: Real economic developments in the MED region
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Individual country performance has varied significantly since 1995 and might be explained by a 
combination of various external and country-specific factors.4 On the positive side, Tunisia’s 
GDP growth averaged 4.8% per year; the origins of this can be traced back to a series of 
economic adjustment programmes which focused on prudent macroeconomic management, a 
gradual liberalisation of domestic prices, a downsizing of the public sector and trade 
liberalisation. On the negative side, Morocco’s and Lebanon’s growth performance barely 
reached the 3% level for the period 1995-2004, which translated into a relative decline in the 
income level. In the case of Morocco this was mainly due to external developments (six droughts 
in ten years, slow European growth) as well as stagnation on the structural reform side, while 
Lebanon’s poor performance relates to macroeconomic imbalances, persistent structural and 
administrative impediments and the deterioration in the geopolitical environment. 
 
                                                 
4  Krause, G. (2003), “Basic Economic Characteristics and Selected Economic Trends of Mediterranean Countries” 
in “Economic Review of EU Mediterranean Partners”, DG ECFIN Occasional Paper, Nr. 2, January. 
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Population growth and employment 
 
As mentioned above, high population growth explains partly the lack of convergence of 
Mediterranean income levels with the EU income level, despite growth rates well above the EU 
average. Although the population growth in the Mediterranean countries is gradually slowing 
down, it continues to grow relatively rapidly at 1.9% on average per year in the period 1995-
2004 (1980-2000: 2.1%), in contrast to the relatively stagnant populations of EU Member States, 
which increased by 0.3% on average per year in the same period (Chart 3). The strongest 
reduction in annual population growth rates since 1995 was recorded in the three Maghreb 
countries, which dropped by between 0.4 and 0.8 percentage points to below 2%. Syria and 
Jordan also experienced strong decreases, although both countries continue to display the highest 
growth rates in the region, with 2.5% and 3.1% respectively. The population growth rates of all 
other countries broadly stabilised.   
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Chart 3: MED and EU - Population growth rates
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Overall, officially reported unemployment rates remain high, ranging from around 11% (of total 
labour force) in Egypt to 28% in West Bank and Gaza. Actual unemployment is substantially 
higher than the officially reported figures, due to the poor quality of labour statistics and some 
existing under-employment in the agricultural sector. Unemployment was somewhat reduced in 
the years immediately after the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, but this positive development was 
partly reversed since the end of the 1990s. The weighted average official unemployment rate for 
the region declined by around one percentage point to 12.5% in 1998-99 on the back of 
favourable growth developments. However, the regional unemployment rate was later forced 
back to its original level as economic growth declined to below 2% in 2001-02.  
 
Although overall population growth has started to slow down, there is a substantial time lag 
involved before this evolution influences labour force growth. As a consequence, Mediterranean 
countries will have to cope with a labour force that is expected to continue growing 2.9% on 
average up to 2010. Syria, Algeria, and Jordan are expected to experience the strongest labour 
force growth rates this decade, averaging between 3.4% and 3.8% per year.  
 
Labour participation in Mediterranean countries has remained at a relatively low level since the 
mid of the 1990s, while a clear – though slow – rising trend of female participation could be 
observed. The average participation rate of the Mediterranean labour force has remained at a 
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level of close to 50% since the second half of the 1990s (Table 1).5 The relatively unchanged 
level of the labour force participation rate needs to be considered against the background of 
rapidly growing labour forces. Female employment as part of the total labour force rose from 
around 29% to 32% during the past few years, affecting all Mediterranean countries, except for 
Egypt, and was particularly pronounced in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Tunisia and Algeria.        
 
Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia WB&G
Year 1996 1994 1994 1997 1995 1998 1997 2001
Participation rate (Pop.) 27.4 30.4 --- --- 34.0 36.0 28.3 32.4 ---
Participation rate (Lab. force) 44.9 48.9 53.6 --- 46.8 52.0 49.7 48.6 38.8
Year 2001 2001 2003 2003 2002 2003 2002
Participation rate (Pop.) 27.8 30 --- --- --- 37.4 31.9 35 20.5
Participation rate (Lab. force) n.a. 44.9 54.5 --- --- 51.9 53.3 --- 38.1
Source: International Labour Office, DG ECFIN calculation.
Table 1: MED region - Employment indicators
 
 
 
Poverty and selected social indicators 
 
Several Mediterranean countries continue to experience poverty incidence, notwithstanding 
their relatively good progress in meeting the Millennium Development Goal of “eradicating 
poverty and improving lives” in the last decade. Poor people, defined as the percentage of the 
population living below USD 2 per day, ranged from around 7% in Jordan and Tunisia to 44% in 
Egypt6. National poverty indicators point to a positive evolution in Algeria and Egypt, where the 
proportion of the population poor people living in poverty declined by ten and six percentage 
points respectively in the second half of the 1990’s. On the negative side, Morocco saw the 
proportion of people living below the national poverty line increase by six percentage points to 
around 20%, probably due to insufficient economic growth. Poverty is particularly marked in 
rural areas and in the West Bank and Gaza, the latter being heavily affected by the difficult 
security situation.  
 
Life expectancy in the Mediterranean region has broadly increased by 2-4 years since the 
second half of the 1990s, leading to an average life expectancy of more than 70 years in most 
Mediterranean countries (Table 2). Improved health conditions, notably for children, have 
contributed to higher life expectancy in the Mediterranean region. Whereas overall health 
expenditure is generally lower than that in the EU, the share of private health expenditure in the 
Mediterranean region is relatively high. 
 
Significant improvements have been recorded in child health during the past ten years. All 
Mediterranean countries have successfully reduced child mortality rates and, overall, seem to be 
on track to meet the Millennium Development Goal of reducing the under-five mortality rate by 
two thirds between 1990 and 2015.7 Child immunisation against measles has also increased, 
except in Algeria. Despite the progress made, there is little scope for complacency about health 
conditions in the Mediterranean. Child malnutrition due to widespread poverty is still a problem 
in some areas of the Mediterranean region, such as Algeria and Syria. Maternal mortality levels 
                                                 
5 Average participation rates were calculated as arithmetic averages.   
6 World Development Indicators (2004) using 1997 data for Jordan, and 2000 data for Egypt and Tunisia. No data is 
available for Israel, Lebanon, Syria or the West Bank and Gaza. National poverty indicators show a brighter picture 
for Egypt (poverty rates of 17% in 1999/00), and a worse one for Morocco and Jordan (respectively, 13% and 15%). 
7 Millennium Development target 5. 
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also remain very high in some countries, notably Morocco. If the incidence of tuberculosis (TB) 
is taken as a proxy for general health conditions, the picture for the Mediterranean region is 
rather mixed (Table 2): while some countries have been successful in reducing the incidence of 
TB to European levels (Jordan, Israel and Lebanon), very high rates have been registered in 
others (such as Morocco).  
 
Public health 
expenditures 
(% GDP)
Private health 
expenditures 
(% GDP)
Malnutrition -
weight for age 
(% of children 
under 5)
Maternal 
mortality ratio 
(per 100,000 
live births)
Incidence of 
tuberculosis 
(per 100,000 
people)
1995 2001 2001 2001 1995 2002 2000 2000 2002
Algeria 69 71 3 1 55 49 6 140 52
Egypt 65 69 2 2 71 39 4 84 29
Israel 77 79 6 3 7 6 .. 17 10
Jordan 70 72 5 5 37 33 .. 41 5
Lebanon 69 71 .. .. 34 32 .. 150 14
Morocco 66 68 2 3 61 43 .. 220 114
Syria 68 70 2 3 36 28 7 160 44
Tunisia 71 73 5 2 37 26 4 120 23
WB&G 70 73 .. .. .. .. .. 27
Simple average MED 69 72 4 3 42 32 5 117 35
Lower middle income 68 69 3 3 49 40 9 440 164
MENA 66 69 3 2 67 54 .. 165 57
Sample EU Member States
Austria 77 79 6 3 7 5 15
Belgium 77 79 6 3 9 6 14
Czech 73 75 7 1 8 5 13
Hungary 70 72 5 2 12 9 32
Italy 78 78 6 2 7 6 8
Netherlands 77 78 6 3 6 5 8
Source: WB 2004 WDI. Data for other years have sometimes been used depending on availability.
Data for low & middle income countries for maternal mortality and incidence of tuberculosis.
Life expectancy 
at birth
Under-five 
mortality rate
Table 2: MED region - Health indicators
 
 
Some improvements were recorded in facilitating access to water and sanitation in the 
Mediterranean region, which is generally better than compared to their neighbouring peers. 2000 
data reveals that the Mediterranean region was making steady advances towards achieving the 
Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015.8 However, significant weaknesses remain in 
the delivery of these basic services. In 2000, only 70% of Moroccans had access to sanitation 
facilities, and 80% of the population in Morocco, Syria and Tunisia had access to good quality 
sources of water. Access to water and sanitation facilities, as well as to other basic services, is 
sometimes problematic in areas of high population density. Some small Mediterranean countries 
such as Israel, Lebanon, and the West Bank and Gaza are characterised by high and increasing 
population density. Density is clearly lower in the larger Mediterranean countries, but people 
tend to be concentrated in cities, where labour prospects are more attractive, or in the limited 
rural areas which are fertile.9   
 
Progress in reducing gender disparities in the Mediterranean region has continued since the 
second half of the 1990s but there remains substantial room for improvement. Female 
participation in the education system has continued to rise during the past ten years (Table 3). In 
particular, the gap between girls’ and boys’ participation in primary and secondary education is 
gradually closing, with particular progress made in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. In some 
countries (Jordan and Lebanon) girls are even more numerous than boys in primary and 
secondary schools in the year 2000. Looking at performance in 2001 and 2002, Mediterranean 
                                                 
8 Millennium Development target 10. 
9 Arable land represents less than 3% of total land in Algeria, Egypt and Jordan, and about 15-20% of land in most 
other Mediterranean countries. 
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countries appeared well on track to meet the Millennium Development Goal of eliminating 
gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005.10 Nevertheless, despite this 
progress, in several Mediterranean countries the literacy rate of young women remains lower 
than that of young men. In Morocco only 60% of young women were literate in 2002.  
 
Female participation in the labour force is relatively low in the Mediterranean region, although 
somewhat higher than the average for the MENA region.11 In 2002, women represented about 
30% of the total labour force in most Mediterranean countries after modest increases of 
participation rates since the mid-1990s. Female participation is particularly low in non-
agricultural sectors (about one quarter of total employment in those sectors) and seems to be 
stagnating. The lower education and labour participation may explain, in addition to entrenched 
traditional role models, why women in Mediterranean countries are hardly represented in 
political life, particularly in Lebanon and Egypt.12  
 
Ratio of girls to 
boys in primary and 
secondary 
education
Ratio of young 
literate females to 
males (% aged 15-
24)
Share of women 
employed in the 
nonagricultural 
sector (%)
Proportion of 
seats held by 
women in 
parliament (%)
1995 2000-01 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 2000-02 2003
Algeria 86 99 85 91 77 86 25 29 12 6
Egypt 77 93 77 .. 57 .. 29 31 20 2
Israel 99 100 100 100 99 99 40 42 49 15
Jordan 96 101 99 100 98 100 21 26 21 6
Lebanon .. 102 94 96 .. .. 28 30 .. 2
Morocco 72 85 69 79 50 61 35 35 27 11
Syria 86 92 78 84 73 93 26 28 17 12
Tunisia 89 100 88 93 84 91 30 32 .. 12
WB&G .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Simple average MED 86 96 86 92 77 88 29 32 24 8
Lower middle income 88 .. 96 98 93 .. 43 43 … ..
MENA 81 91 84 85 82 .. 26 29 .. ..
Sample EU MS
Austria 91 97 .. .. .. .. 40 40 44 34
Italy 95 98 100 100 100 100 38 39 41 12
Belgium 99 106 .. .. .. .. 40 41 45 35
Greece 95 101 100 100 100 100 37 38 41 9
Hungary 98 100 100 100 100 100 45 45 46 10
Poland 95 98 100 100 .. .. 46 46 47 20
Spain 102 102 100 100 100 100 36 37 39 28
Source: WB 2004 WDI. Data for other years have sometimes been used depending on availability.
female labour force 
(% of labour force)
Literacy, young female 
(% of female aged 15-
24)
Table 3: MED region - Gender equality
 
 
Public spending in education in the Mediterranean region is substantial and amounts to more 
than 5% of GDP, above the average spending of lower-middle income countries (Table 4). 
However, due to the large cohorts of young people (more than 30% of the Mediterranean 
population is below the age of 14), there appear to be pressures on available resources. If the 
currently high education outlays are to be made financially sustainable, spending will have to be 
made more efficient and resources for education from non-government sources mobilised.  
 
Participation in education has improved since the second half of the 1990s. Notably, net 
enrolment of children in primary education has increased in most Mediterranean countries and it 
is generally better than the average for lower-middle income countries and the MENA region. 
Starting from a low level, Jordan and Morocco made particularly significant progress in raising 
children’s, and particularly girls’, enrolment in primary schools, but efforts need to be sustained 
to achieve universal enrolment. Progress was also achieved in the Mediterranean region in 
raising enrolment rates in secondary and tertiary education. However, although better than the 
                                                 
10 Millennium Development target 4. 
11 The term MENA is used by International Financial Institutions to refer to all countries of the Middle East North 
Africa region and is larger than the term Mediterranean countries (See Footnote 2). 
12 Some EU Member States also record a relatively low score in this area. 
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average for the MENA region and low- to middle-income countries, enrolment rates in 
secondary and tertiary education remain far lower than in the EU, pointing to the need to raise 
the level of education beyond primary education to close the human capital gap. 
 
There also remain problems with the efficiency of educational systems and outcomes in the 
Mediterranean region. Mediterranean countries appear to be falling short of the Millennium 
Development Goal of universal primary school completion by 2015.13 Although improving, 
primary completion rates remain particularly low in the West Bank and Gaza and still below 
70% of the student population in Lebanon and Morocco. Youth literacy has continued to 
improve since the second half of the 1990s in all Mediterranean countries and especially in 
Algeria, Morocco and Syria, but efforts need to continue to raise levels further, particularly in 
Morocco.14  
 
Net enrollment ratio 
in primary education 
(% of relevant age 
group)
Youth literacy rate 
(% ages 15-24)
Internet users 
(per 1000 
people)
1995 2001/02 1995 2001/02 1995/96 2000/01 1990 2001/02 1995 2001/02 2002
Algeria 5 95 95 56 62 82 96 84 90 16
Egypt 5 93 90 67 78 77 91 66 .. 28
Israel 7 7 .. 100 .. 88 .. 99 100 301
Jordan 8 5 67 91 41 80 102 98 98 99 58
Lebanon 3 3 76 90 .. 68 .. .. 117
Morocco 6 5 72 88 .. 31 47 68 62 70 24
Syria 3 4 91 98 39 39 98 89 84 95 13
Tunisia 6 7 98 97 54 68 75 98 90 94 52
WB&G .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 66 .. .. 30
Simple avg. MED 5 5 85 94 64 80 84 83 91 71
Lower middle income 4 4 96 91 97 95 97 46
MENA 5 87 83 62 54 91 88 87 37
Sample EU MS
Denmark 8 99 89 .. .. 513
France 6 100 92 .. .. 314
Greece 4 95 85 .. 100 155
Hungary 5 90 87 .. 100 158
Italy 5 100 88 .. 100 352
Poland 5 98 91 95 .. 230
Spain .. .. 93 108 97 156
Source: WB 2004 WDI. Data for other years have sometimes been used depending on availability.
Table 4: MED region - Education   
Primary 
completion rate 
(% of relevant age 
group)
Public spending 
on education (% of 
GDP) 
net enrollment in 
secondary 
education         
 
 
Education systems in most Mediterranean countries, with the exception of Israel, also appear to 
be lagging behind the requirements of modern societies. The mismatch between education 
provided in schools and the actual needs of the employers contributes to high levels of youth 
unemployment in the region. Low rates of enrolment in secondary and tertiary education are 
among the factors contributing to the low level of high-tech skills in most Mediterranean 
countries and the relatively slow catching up of IT services. 
 
In many Mediterranean countries, problems in the education system are compounded by the 
“brain-drain” phenomenon. The result is low skills availability, which in turn is one of the 
determinants of the region’s modest technological and scientific performance. With the 
                                                 
13 The Millennium Development target 3 foresees that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, should be 
able to complete a full course of primary schooling. Primary completion rate is the ratio of the total number of 
students successfully completing (or graduating from) the last year of primary school in a given year to the total 
number of children of official graduation age in the population. Because it measures the coverage of the education 
system and the educational attainment of students, the primary completion rate is a more accurate indicator of 
human capital formation and the quality and efficiency of the school system than are gross and net enrolment ratios. 
14 Literacy in the 15-24 age group. 
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exception of Israel, where high-tech industries have been the main driving force of the economy, 
Mediterranean partners lag behind in knowledge creation and use. R&D investment as a 
percentage of GNP is generally low (0.19% in Egypt and 0.45% in Tunisia compared to around 
2% in the EU in 2000), and so is the share of high-tech in total manufactured exports (0.6% in 
Syria, but 11% in Tunisia). Technology transfers (through FDI and licensing) seem to be the 
preferred way of acquiring knowledge for many of these countries. 
 
 
3.   Creating conditions for greater prosperity — an assessment of some key areas 
 
This part of the paper assesses progress in some of the areas considered important for growth, 
investment and employment. The countries that have successfully combined more trade with 
higher growth and human development tend to have some key features in common. They have 
gradually opened up their economies as part of a broader development strategy based on two 
main pillars: (i) improving the investment climate for the private sector to generate jobs and (ii) 
empowering people, especially through better education.  Macroeconomic stability, open and 
outward-looking economies and a friendly business environment are therefore some of the 
characteristics generally associated with successful development strategies.   
 
 
Macroeconomic stability 
 
Mediterranean countries have achieved some progress in obtaining and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability since the Barcelona Declaration, although challenges need to be met 
to preserve these achievements in the future. Reaching a higher degree of macroeconomic 
stability was mainly attributable to reinforced monetary policies, while the contribution of fiscal 
policy remained modest. The recent increase in oil revenues has not been accompanied with 
fiscal consolidation in oil- exporting countries, while in oil-importing countries fiscal policy 
remains largely dependent on external assistance. The absence of forceful fiscal consolidation 
course is the weak link in the overall macroeconomic policy mix, which puts a question mark on 
the sustainability of the achieved results. Finally, the absence of sound fiscal policies prohibits 
Mediterranean countries to develop a higher capacity to absorb external shocks.    
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Mediterranean countries have experienced a remarkable disinflation process over the past 
decade. The average inflation rate fell from around 12% in 1995 to around 3% in 2003 and 2004 
(Chart 4). A comparison of average inflation rates in the early 1990's and the past five years 
reveals that the fall in inflation has been particularly pronounced in Algeria, Jordan, Israel and 
Syria, where double-digit rates have been compressed well below the 5% level. In most cases the 
disinflation process has been mainly based on tighter monetary policies, often relying on pegged 
exchange rate as nominal anchors. The contribution of fiscal policy to this outcome has been 
modest as fiscal deficits have declined only slightly over the period. Subdued world prices of 
most imports assisted in this process in the second half of the 1990s, but the impact of this factor 
has been reversed recently as oil prices climbed well above the USD 40 level.  
 
In 2004, as in 1995, exchange rate policies in the Mediterranean countries were very diverse but 
in each country they played an important role in the conduction of monetary policies. The 
prevailing exchange rate regimes can broadly be classified into three categories15 : soft pegs 
(Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria), exchange rate bands (Egypt, Israel) and managed 
floating exchange rates (Algeria, Tunisia). Most exchange rate regimes and financial systems are 
protected by restrictions on capital flows. Since 1995, only a few Mediterranean countries have 
followed the global trend towards a higher degree of flexibility (e.g. Egypt), and then only 
cautiously; only minor advances in capital account liberalisation could be observed. Given that 
all Mediterranean countries can be classified as small, open economies, exchange rate 
developments are crucial in determining inflation performance, which might partly also explain 
their "fear of floating". 
 
The extent to which market forces are free to determine exchange rates as well as the choice of 
the reference currency varies significantly among Mediterranean countries. In Syria, several 
administered exchange rates of the pound still coexist, while the Israeli shekel is almost 
completely market-determined, although within broad exchange-rate bands of +/- 50%. Finally, 
the US dollar has been able to maintain its predominance as the reference currency in the region, 
reflecting the existing inertia in the global financial system due to network externalities, the 
importance of dollar-based trade such as petroleum exports and imports, and political 
motivations. The euro has taken over the lead from the US dollar only in Morocco and Tunisia in 
terms of becoming the reference currency for the respective exchange rate system. 
 
Following a relatively successful fiscal consolidation course up to the end of the 1990s, fiscal 
performance net of grants has deteriorated in a number of countries (Table 5). The recent 
increase in oil revenues has not been accompanied with fiscal consolidation in oil- exporting 
countries, while in some oil-importing countries fiscal policy remains largely dependent on 
external assistance. As a result of lower-than-expected growth and depressed revenues, but also 
due to higher expenditure in some cases, the average fiscal budget deficit increased to around 
4.4% for Mediterranean countries in 2002-03.16 In particular, Egypt’s general government deficit 
has widened markedly since 2001 on account of declining revenues and rising expenditure. A 
sharp fiscal deterioration took place in Israel during 2002 and 2003, as a result of lower revenues 
linked to the economic slowdown and higher defence expenditure since the upsurge of the 
second intifada. Fiscal performance also worsened in Jordan because of a shortfall in receipts 
associated with the difficult regional situation. Finally, Syria's fiscal position deteriorated in 
2002 and 2003 on account of higher expenditure.  
                                                 
15 This DG ECFIN classification is based on the de-facto management of the exchange rate. De-facto exchange rate 
management may differ from officially announced exchange rate regimes (as also used in the IMF’s Classification 
of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks). 
16 Preliminary data and estimates for fiscal data for 2004 indicate that the weighted average fiscal deficit was 
lowered by one percentage point.   
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MED Algeria1,2 Egypt3 Israel1,4 Jordan5 Lebanon1 Morocco1,6 Syria7 Tunisia8
1997 --- 2.3 --- --- -7.3 -27.4 --- --- -4.4
1998 --- -3.8 --- --- -9.7 -18.3 --- --- -3.0
1999 --- -2.0 -0.6 -5.1 -7.0 -16.2 -4.5 --- -3.9
2000 -2.3 9.7 -1.8 -3.2 -8.9 -24.6 -6.4 -1.5 -3.9
2001 -4.0 3.0 -2.7 -6.5 -8.0 -18.9 -5.8 2.5 -3.8
2002 -4.5 0.2 -3.5 -6.3 -10.1 -15.1 -4.7 -1.6 -3.5
2003 -4.3 5.0 -3.3 -8.1 -13.0 -14.6 -5.5 -1.6 -3.5
2004 est. -3.3 5.2 --- -6.1 -13.4 -8.2 -5.9 -2.7 -2.8
Source: calculations based on IMF Article IV consultations. Data for 2004 are estimates or projections.
All data exclude revenues from privatisation.
1 Central government balance.
2 Including the balance of special accounts and net lending to the Treasury
3 The fiscal year runs in Egypt from July to June. Therefore, for example, data for 2002 refers to the period July 2001 to June 2002.
4 For 2002, 2003 and 2004 the balance is calculated using estimates of foreign grants.
5 Covers the central government and budgetary agencies. Includes non-budget account net spending.
6 Including other special treasury accounts and Fond Hassan II expenditures.
7 Consolidated budget balance including grants and operations of the Price Stabilisation Fund (PSF).
8 Including special funds, the fonds de concours and the social security accounts.
Table 5: General government fiscal balances excluding grants (% of GDP)
 
 
Recent fiscal developments highlight the Mediterranean region’s low capacity to adjust to 
external shocks and reveal upcoming challenges. Notably, fiscal revenues (except Algeria)  in 
almost all Mediterranean countries have been weakened in the past years due to declining 
mineral wealth, receding customs revenues on the back of trade liberalisation, and reduced 
earnings from state enterprises as a consequence of the slowly advancing privatisation process. 
Although all Mediterranean countries have increasingly relied on taxes on the sale of goods and 
services to compensate for the decline in revenues, in most of them revenues from direct taxation 
are relatively low because of the frequent use of exemptions, large informal sectors and 
widespread evasion. The Mediterranean region also faces considerable rigidities on the 
expenditure side, including high costs related to the provision of public services (via a large civil 
service), large direct income support and price subsidies and in some cases high expenditure on 
interest payments on debt.  
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Chart 5: MED external account balances in 2004
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Source: National Statistical Offices, national Central Banks.  2002/03 data for Egypt. 
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In line with a better handling of macroeconomic policy instruments Mediterranean external 
accounts have displayed an overall improvement since 1995, but a high degree of variety 
continues to characterise balance-of-payments structures (Chart 5). The average trade deficit 
declined to close to balance, supported in particular by higher commodity prices since the end of 
the 1990s, while the average current account balance moved solidly into surplus. Looking at the 
country level, large discrepancies emerge. Israel's and Tunisia's economies featured minor 
current account deficits in the past five years, while Jordan and Syria recorded small surpluses in 
this period. The highly volatile current account balances of Algeria and Egypt have been reacting 
sensitively towards changes in the oil price, as these countries are the strongest oil exporters in 
the region. The chronically high current account deficit of Lebanon, exceeding 20% of GDP for 
most of the last decade, is exceptional and gives grounds for concern.       
 
The absence of a strong fiscal consolidation course highlights the region’s low capacity to adjust 
to external shocks. This might be also one reason for continued high external account volatility, 
nurtured by several factors, albeit to varying degrees. Firstly, the region’s trade patterns are 
influenced by hydrocarbon price changes, as countries either have significant oil and/or gas 
exports (Algeria, Egypt and Syria) or are dependent on petroleum imports. Secondly, the 
region’s agricultural import demand has shown erratic swings due to irregular weather 
conditions. Furthermore, the external balance of some countries is supported by strong tourism 
revenues and by substantial transfers/remittances of non-residents to their home country from the 
Gulf countries and Europe; in Jordan, for example, these flows amount to 20% of GDP. Along 
with revenue from tourism and merchandise exports, these transfers/remittances represent very 
significant sources of foreign exchange earnings in the region, unlike FDI, which has remained 
at a very modest level.   
 
 
Integration into the global economy17 
 
Mediterranean countries appear to have increased their trade openness to the world, but recent 
developments need to be interpreted with caution (Chart 6). The average degree of openness 
(exports and imports of goods as a proportion of GDP) is around 62% of GDP in 2003, 
significantly up from around 36% in 1995. Lebanon and Tunisia are now the most open 
economies in the region, with degrees of openness ranging from 80 to 100% of GDP since 1995, 
while Egypt and Israel display the lowest degree of openness (between 25% and 40%). The rise 
in Mediterranean trade reflects a number of factors including unilateral trade preferences granted 
by the EU, increased EU aggregate demand, early trade liberalisation by some Mediterranean 
countries such as Jordan and Tunisia, and in some cases special factors like the strong 
dependency on aid-funded imports (West Bank & Gaza). However, two qualifications need to be 
made. First, the price of oil distorts the overall picture and oil and non-oil goods should ideally 
be treated separately. Second, for a more complete picture of trade openness, trade in services 
would need to be included.  
 
Trade integration with the world, which stagnated up to the second half of the 1990s, appears to 
have made some progress since 1995.18 On average, Mediterranean countries increased their 
exports and imports of goods by around 60% between 1995 and 2003, outperforming world 
trade, which rose by 46% in the same period. This represents a clear distinction with the past, 
where world trade (1980-2000: increase by a factor of 5.3), displayed higher growth rates than 
Mediterranean trade (1980-2000: increase by a factor of 4.1). Since the Barcelona Declaration, 
                                                 
17 For a detailed discussion of the impact of the Barcelona process on trade, see Baecker A. “The impact of the 
Barcelona Process on trade and foreign direct investment” page 24. 
18 Source: IFS DOTS. 
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the highest trade (in goods) increases have been observed in Algeria and Egypt, while for most 
other Mediterranean countries trade growth has been in line with the growth of world trade.19 
This relatively positive evolution allowed Mediterranean countries to somewhat increase their 
market share in total world trade from 1.2% in 1995 to 1.3% in 2003. Notwithstanding this 
positive development, their world market share remains lower than it was in 1980 (2.3%).  
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Chart 6: Degree of openness of MED countries 
Source: DRI-WEFA, IFS, IIF.
Excluding West Bank and Gaza.
The data source, IMF DOTS, allows a cross-country comparison, while beeing at the same time covering only merchandise trade. The inclusion of trade in services would therefore 
increase the degree of openess for each country.  
Average degree of openness
Exports and imports of merchandise goods as % of GDP
35%
62%
 
 
 
MED Maghreb Mashrek Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia
1980 51.4 50.6 55.8 44.4 50.2 50.4 3.5 --- 68.7 69.7 76.5
1990 57.1 73.4 42.0 69.9 43.4 39.9 6.0 39.8 73.1 46.7 85.9
1995 48.1 67.3 52.8 64.8 45.8 31.3 5.1 22.6 58.9 57.0 78.5
2000 51.6 70.5 56.5 66.5 56.7 28.7 6.4 30.4 68.9 68.3 88.4
2003 46.7 65.9 48.8 59.3 40.6 26.9 2.9 16.0 68.4 46.1 80.6
MED Maghreb Mashrek Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Syria Tunisia
1980 62.9 73.2 52.7 72.8 49.4 50.0 52.8 --- 69.6 57.4 78.4
1990 58.0 67.0 46.5 65.9 47.1 56.5 40.9 45.2 64.2 51.5 72.2
1995 50.6 64.0 45.1 59.3 38.9 52.3 33.2 47.3 --- 34.4 70.3
2000 53.4 71.2 42.9 62.0 41.6 48.4 41.6 47.5 74.7 43.5 76.6
2003 45.9 66.8 43.3 63.2 34.7 40.8 25.1 53.5 --- 31.6 71.0
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, Commission services calculation.
Table 6: Trade integration with the EU
Exports to the EU in % of total MED exports
Imports from the EU in % of total MED imports
 
 
 
The EU is the main trading partner for the Mediterranean countries, although its weight 
decreased in the last decade after remaining broadly stable during the 1980s (Table 6). Overall 
trade of Mediterranean countries with the EU fell from 58% of total Mediterranean countries’ 
trade in the period 1980-90 to around 52% in 2000, with broadly similar declines in both exports 
                                                 
19 Both Algeria and Egypt are late-comers since the ratification of the Association Agreement took place only 
recently in Egypt, while for Algeria it is expected for 2005. 
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and imports.20 The EU share fell further towards the 45% level in 2003, but recent years might 
represent more a cyclical movement due to the high oil price in particular, rather than a 
continuation of this declining trend. Trade diversification away from the EU has occurred most 
strongly in Israel, Jordan, Syria and Egypt, while Tunisia and Morocco have maintained their 
strong trade links with the EU. In general, the EU Member States remain the dominant trading 
partners for Maghreb countries, as two thirds of export and import activities are conducted with 
the former 15 EU Member States. The countries with the weakest trade links with the EU are 
Israel and Jordan, with the latter exporting less than 10% of its total exports to the EU.  
 
A high level of protectionism in the trade regimes of Mediterranean countries can still be 
observed despite recent liberalisation measures. In 2003, as in 1995, six out of the eight 
Mediterranean countries for which data is available had trade regimes that could be classified as 
“repressed”.21 The free flow of goods and services with third countries appears to be mostly 
constrained by a combination of high tariffs on imports, substantial informal non-tariff barriers 
such as complicated, lengthy and non-transparent customs procedures and a certain degree of 
corruption in the customs services. Despite the downward trend in tariff rates during the last 20 
years, the Mediterranean region is still one of the most protected in the world. Relatively high 
costs and poor quality of transport facilities represent additional non-tariff barriers to exports to 
the region.22 Only Israel appears to have a level of non-trade barriers similar to the EU and has 
an average tariff rate close to that in the EU.  
 
 
 
Box 1: The EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements23 
 
The implementation of trade liberalisation measures has been stimulated by the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership, 
which calls, among other things, for the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by the end of this 
decade. The process of trade liberalisation provided for by the Association Agreements between the EU and 
Mediterranean countries consists of several steps, of which the most sensitive and the widest-ranging still have to be 
implemented.  
 
The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 set 2010 as the target date to complete the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. 
However, full trade liberalisation will occur later than 2010 given the length of the transition periods foreseen in the 
bilateral Association Agreements, the time frame for their ratification and the need to progress with the South-South 
dimension. The agreement between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia on a regional free trade agreement (Agadir 
agreement, signed in 2004) is a notable development with respect to regional integration. 
 
The bilateral Euro-Med Association Agreements include a trade liberalisation commitment by the Mediterranean 
partners which complements the tariff-free treatment (for industrial goods) already granted to their exports to the EU 
since the mid-1970s and which is preserved under the Agreements. Under the terms of the Agreements the partners 
gradually remove all tariffs on imports of industrial products from the EU over a period of 12 years (15 in the case 
of Egypt). The specific time schedules for tariff dismantling differ depending on the sensitivity of the goods in 
question. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. The change in the oil price distorts somewhat the overall picture and 
should be taken into account when assessing developments. 
21 Heritage Foundation (2002), “2002 Index of Economic Freedom”. 
22 FEMISE (2001), “Economic Transition Process and the Implementation of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership", 
FEMISE Report, September. 
23 For further information on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Barcelona Declaration and the Association 
Agreements: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/intro/index.htm. 
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Market-oriented reforms and governance 
 
Over the past decade, some progress has been achieved with regard to the implementation of 
structural reforms.24 Many indicators have been established to measure countries’ progress in 
market-oriented reforms and to allow cross-country comparisons, sometimes leading to different 
conclusions. For instance, the Fraser Institute’s "Economic Freedom of the World" index points 
to remarkable progress by the Mediterranean region in implementing reform between 1995 and 
2002 (Table 7).25 Overall, according to this index Mediterranean countries have in recent years 
reached the level that the countries that recently acceded to the EU had in 1995. According to 
this index, most of the improvement can be observed in Jordan and Israel, mainly as a result of a 
strengthened legal framework, increased freedom to trade with third countries and greater 
monetary stability. By contrast, despite some reform efforts and progress, in 2003 Syria came 
only 103th out of a sample of 123 countries.26 Algeria's progress also appears modest; it is ranked 
only 118th, due to weaknesses in all five categories of the index.27  
 
1995 2002 1995 2004 1996 2002
Algeria 3.82 4.56 3.68 3.31 -0.97 -0.81
Egypt 5.80 6.19 3.69 3.28 -0.19 -0.37
Israel 5.71 6.63 2.90 2.36 0.87 0.56
Jordan 6.06 7.03 2.90 2.73 0.07 -0.01
Lebanon --- --- 2.96 3.13 -0.20 -0.44
Morocco 5.90 5.90 3.03 2.93 -0.12 -0.05
Syria 4.39 5.35 4.15 3.88 -0.72 -0.66
Tunisia 5.95 6.31 2.98 2.94 0.03 0.11
West Bank and Gaza --- --- --- --- 0.07 -1.02
Israel 5.71 6.63 2.90 2.36 0.87 0.56
Maghreb4 5.22 5.59 3.23 3.06 -0.35 -0.25
Mashrek4 5.42 6.19 3.30 3.26 -0.20 -0.50
MED Countries4 5.38 6.00 3.20 3.07 -0.13 -0.30
1 The Fraser index runs from 1 to 10. Higher values reflect institutions and policies conducive to freedom for economic activities.
2 The Heritage index runs from 1 to 5. A score of 1 indicates an institutional framework and a set of policies that are most conducive to 
economic freedom while a score of 5 indicates signifies a set of policies that are least conducive.
3 The WB scales run from -2.5 to +2.5, whereby higher values reflect better policies.
4 Arithmetic average.
Econ. Freedom Index Econ. Freedom Index Governance Index
Table 7: Indices measuring reform progress in MED countries
Heritage Foundation2Fraser Institute1 World Bank3
 
 
The index of the Heritage Foundation, which also measures economic freedom, in 2004 comes to 
a more pessimistic assessment for Mediterranean countries, indicating only modest 
                                                 
24 Each country section contains a more detailed description of the pace and quality of structural reforms. 
25 The Fraser's Institute index reflects whether institutional characteristics and the set of policies pursued are 
conducive to freedom for economic activities and, hence, for growth. It does not cover Lebanon or the West Bank 
and Gaza. Data retrieved from Gwartney, J. and R. Lawson R., with W. Park, S. Wagh, C. Edwards and V. de Rugy 
(2002), Economic Freedom of the World: 2002 Annual Report, Vancouver BC. Available via the Internet at 
www.freetheworld.com,,  
26 Economic reforms gained some new momentum since 2001, but remain rather piecemeal and erratic. 
27 Fiscal burden, legal framework, access to sound money, freedom to exchange with foreigners and regulation of 
credit, labour and business. 
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improvements since 1995 (Table 7).28 According to the Heritage Foundation, most countries still 
belong to the category "mostly un-free countries". Some progress was observed in Israel, Egypt 
and Algeria, mostly as a result of an improved monetary policy framework and a strengthening 
of property rights, while Tunisia hardly advanced and Lebanon even moved slightly backwards 
in the past seven years. According to this index, the reform efforts of Mediterranean countries 
compare even less favourably with those of the former ten accession countries.  
 
Both the Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation indices reveal that freedom of economic 
activity in the Mediterranean is still constrained by numerous factors, including a high fiscal 
burden, strong government intervention in trade, a high regulatory burden and a relatively weak 
legal framework. Along with trade restrictions29, the fiscal burden – measured by a combination 
of the size of government expenditures and the tax rate – is one of the areas where the least 
progress has been achieved (in particularly in Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Syria). Furthermore, 
substantial public ownership of enterprises and large public consumption distort private sector 
activity. As a consequence of these constraints on economic activity, black market and informal 
activities are prevalent among Mediterranean countries, with the overall size of the informal 
sector estimated to vary between 30% and 70% of GDP.30 
 
The FEMISE network of Euro-Mediterranean economic institutes, drawing on the Fraser 
Institute and Heritage Foundation indices, also commented on the slow pace of economic 
transition in Mediterranean countries and, additionally, evaluated the structural reform progress 
in the Mediterranean region in the light of the Barcelona Process.3132 While recognising the 
structural reforms undertaken in the region, notably to improve the business environment for 
foreign investment, FEMISE points to the need to enhance other reforms, particularly in the 
areas of trade, competition, corporate taxation and liberalisation of network industries. The 
companion article in this publication on “Business climate in the Mediterranean region” 
highlights the main challenges faced by the business sector in the region.33 
 
The governance index34 developed by the World Bank echoes reform challenges raised by the 
two other indicators and reveals that in Mediterranean countries a heavy regulatory burden 
continuously constrains private sector development (Table 7).35 The effectiveness of 
policymaking is impeded by low perceptions of the quality of public services and the 
competence of civil servants, the civil service’s exposure to political pressure, and governments' 
weak commitment to their policies. Furthermore, economic activity appears to be affected by 
excessive regulation and market-unfriendly policies (e.g. price controls) and corruption. Sub-
indices for regulatory quality and corruption display the highest discrepancies in relation to EU 
standards, reaching values of -0.26 and -0.14 on a scale of +/-2.5. 
 
                                                 
28 Source: Heritage Foundation 2002 Index of Economic Freedom. 
29 International Monetary Fund (2002), World Economic Outlook 2002: Trade and Finance, Washington D. C., 
September. 
30 Friedmann, E. et al. (2000), "Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 
Countries", Journal of Public Economics, 76: 459-493, June. 
31 FEMISE (2001), “Economic Transition Process and the Implementation of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership", 
FEMISE Report, September 
32 FEMISE (2005), Le Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen, 10 Ans Après Barcelone: Acquis et Perspectives, ERF, 
Institut de la Méditerranée, February. 
33 Hansen F., “Business climate in the Mediterranean region”, page 52. 
34 Governance is defined as the capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern interactions among them. 
35 Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2003), "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-
2002", unpublished World Bank Discussion Paper.  
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According to the same World Bank study, the quality of Mediterranean countries’ rule of law 
progressed up to 2000 but fell back below its 1996 level in 2002. It is clear that there are 
challenges with regard to the safeguard of property rights, the enforcement of the commercial 
code and the application of rules on market entry and exit. The average score for Mediterranean 
countries on the rule of law index is 0.03 (scale of +/- 2.5), which shows just how much room for 
improvement remains. In particular, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary is rated 
rather low by the population. The accession countries (which scored 0.72 in 2002) did striking 
better in this respect, in particular in the light of the fact that they only started their transition 
towards a market-oriented legal framework at the beginning of the 1990s.  
 
Financial sector development has progressed in comparison to 1995, but most countries’ 
financial sectors continue to display distortions, which may be, at least partly, explained by the 
significant presence of state banks and direct intervention.36 Credit allocation to the private 
sector in Mediterranean countries continues to be on average below the EU level and is 
particularly low in Algeria and Syria37, as a result of the dominance of their public banking 
sectors. In these countries, credit to the private sector as a percentage of overall domestic credit 
remains below the 50% level. This also holds true for Lebanon, where private banks have 
directed their lending to financing the government’s substantial fiscal deficits, crowding out 
private sector activity. Often, the allocation of a substantial share of funds to investment projects 
in state hands has led to capital misallocation, with political priorities being favoured over 
economic considerations, resulting in the build-up of bad loans (accumulated losses during the 
last years amount to more than 12% of GDP in Algeria). Elevated spreads between deposit and 
lending rates clearly reflect the presence of these distortions. 
 
 
4.   Concluding remarks 
 
So far, progress in achieving the economic objective of the Barcelona Process has been mixed. 
Although some aspects of overall quality of life may have undergone a significant change for the 
better, overall progress towards the objective of “the creation of an area of shared prosperity” has 
been moderate. Despite an increase of around 35% of the income level per capita (PPP terms) in 
the period 1995-2004, the prosperity gap between the Mediterranean region and the EU did not 
close, as the Mediterranean income level in relation to the EU income per capita level remained 
at around 18%. Although the Mediterranean regional growth rate in the period 1995–2004 
compares relatively favourably with the EU’s growth performance, relatively large population 
increases prevented income levels from catching up.  
 
On the positive side, some aspects of well being have improved in the past ten years. Health 
conditions have broadly improved in the region, with significant improvements in child health 
and overall life expectancy. Furthermore, progress in raising access to water sanitation could be 
recorded for most countries, while at the same time Mediterranean countries appear to be on 
track to meet the first Millennium Development Goal of “eradicating poverty and improving 
lives”. Finally, Mediterranean countries’ population growth rates are gradually declining towards 
a more sustainable level, while authorities have started to tackle gender disparities, as evidenced 
by slowly rising female labour market participation and school enrolment rates.   
   
There is evidence that Mediterranean countries have made progress in integrating themselves 
into the global economy, while managing to successfully achieve/maintain macroeconomic 
                                                 
36 Sala-i-Martin, X. and E. V. Artadi (2002), "Economic Growth and Investment in the Arab World”, Columbia 
University Discussion Paper, No. 0203-08, New York.  
37 The country article on Syria provides a comprehensive description of the Syrian banking system. 
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stability. The trade liberalisation provisions of the Association Agreements have assisted 
Mediterranean countries to start or intensify the opening of their trade regimes. Mediterranean 
trade growth seems to have been above average world trade growth for the past years, with 
Mediterranean countries increasing their average degree of openness to the world. As for 
macroeconomic stability, Mediterranean countries have registered a remarkable disinflation 
process over the past decade, with the average inflation rate falling from around 12% in 1995 to 
around 3% in 2003-04, while fiscal accounts were consolidated only to a certain extent.  
 
However, many indicators show that the implementation of structural reforms with a view to 
establishing a fully functioning market economy has been slow in most Mediterranean countries 
since 1995. This slow pace of beyond-the-border reforms did not keep pace with the trade 
liberalisation agenda and may explain why the overall economic performance was rather 
unsatisfactory, particularly in leading to higher income levels. Economic activities have been 
stifled by a burdensome regulatory framework and a lack of transparency and efficiency in the 
public sector, difficulties relating to contract security and enforcement, rigidities with regard to 
the purchase of real estate and weaknesses in the financial sector and labour markets.  
 
 
The way forward – the European Neighbourhood Policy38  
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy might contribute to tackle this structural reform deficit, by 
focusing also on beyond-the-border reforms, in addition to trade liberalisation. The ENP aims to 
lift the level of relations with EU neighbours from traditional trade and cooperation toward 
closer economic integration. On the economic front, the ENP “offers” neighbours:  
 
1) enhanced preferential trade relations, leading in the medium-term to FTAs (this is 
more relevant for NIS countries as MED countries already enjoy duty free access to EU 
markets for industrial products);  
2) “a stake” in the EU Internal Market based upon progress in implementing the acquis 
and other accompanying reforms;  
3) increased financial and technical assistance through the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI);  
4) improved interconnection with the EU in sectors such as energy, transport and the 
information society;  
5) the possibility to participate in some EU programmes (such as research, education).  
 
The perspective of a stake in the Internal Market (still to be defined) is the most novel aspect. 
For the first time, the possibility of participating in the Internal Market is offered to non-
European countries which are economically and socially very different from the EU.  
 
The ENP has the potential to deliver economic benefits for the neighbours via various channels. 
The reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers should bring about efficiency gains and improve 
welfare. Liberalisation of trade in services should be particularly beneficial given the 
neighbours’ background of inefficient or underdeveloped services. Increased prospects for 
market access for agricultural goods would also contribute to growth. Increased financial and 
technical assistance and improved regional interconnection should enhance the framework 
conditions for sustainable economic growth. In addition, the ENP should promote adherence to 
sound macroeconomic and financial sector policies. Finally, the ENP has the potential to anchor 
neighbouring countries’ economic policies by bringing them closer to the EU economic model. 
                                                 
38 This section draws on a forthcoming DG ECFIN paper “The economic dimension of the European 
Neighbourhood policy” by Michaela Dodini and Marco Fantini. 
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Box 2: European Neighbourhood Policy – State of play 
 
Relations between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries have intensified through the ENP launched in 
2003. The policy is designed as a new framework for relations with the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours and is 
built on existing relations and reciprocal commitments (including the Euro-Mediterranean partnership). The ENP 
aims to develop a zone of prosperity and peace, a “ring of friends” with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and 
cooperative relations. In the economic front, this is to be achieved through additional trade liberalisation and the 
prospect for Mediterranean countries of a stake in the EU’s Single Market, accompanied by enhanced financial and 
technical assistance. The provision of these complementary incentives to the Mediterranean countries will depend 
on their concrete progress of demonstrating shared values and effective political, economic and institutional reforms. 
 
Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Syria WB&G
Country reports yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Action Plan yes yes yes yes yes
Source: European Commission
Table 8: ENP - State of play in the MED region
 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy is implemented via bilateral, mutually agreed, Action Plans, based on 
extensive Country Reports. As of March 2005, Country Reports and Action Plans have been completed with the first 
group of seven countries - Moldova, Ukraine, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The 
Action Plans were approved by the Commission in December 2004 and, to enter into force, have to be endorsed by 
the relevant Association or Co-operation Councils. Implementation of the Action Plans will be monitored through 
sectoral sub-committees as well as the economic dialogues. These mutually agreed Action Plans specify reform 
objectives for each of the Mediterranean partner countries as well as EU support. Country Reports have also been 
finalised for the second wave of countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). In the economic 
field, particular emphasis is put on progress in the establishment of a fully functioning market economy through 
structural reforms as well as macroeconomic stability. 
 
Preparations have also advanced on the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). In September 
2004 the Commission tabled a proposal to the Parliament and Council for a regulation establishing the ENPI with an 
allocation of € 14.9 billion for 2007-13. The ENPI will replace TACIS, MEDA and a number of thematic 
programmes covering the EU neighbouring countries. It will also finance cross-border programmes bringing 
together regions of MS and partner countries with a common border. The Action Plans will be the reference for 
drawing assistance priorities. The ENPI will also support the EU-Russia strategic partnership. 
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Annex I:  EU tools to foster market-oriented reforms 
 
The Barcelona process may be expected to contribute on economic and political changes in the 
Mediterranean partner countries via commonly agreed reform objectives and which in sociology 
is known as “socialisation”.39 Commonly agreed reform objectives provide incentives for certain 
achievements, e.g. the pursuit of specific policies, with material and social benefits offered by 
the EU, such as financial and technical assistance (MEDA), institutional ties, market access and 
political dialogue. Through altering the benefits and costs facing political actors, these incentives 
may widen the scope for reforms and prosperity in partner countries. On the other hand, 
socialisation may be defined as a process of inducing behavioural and identity changes through 
interaction with a partner (government, business, civil society, students) resulting in social 
learning, emulation of a model, and drawing the lessons of other’s experience. Sustained 
interactions among both experts and policymakers between the EU and the Mediterranean 
partners are expected to lead to a convergence of expectations on many issues, including 
controversial ones (e.g. democracy, human rights). 
 
When assessing developments since 1995, many other factors need to be taken into account apart 
from the Barcelona process. Most of the Mediterranean partner countries are relatively small, 
open economies, and as such they are exposed to global developments and external shocks. The 
global economic cycle, oil and commodity prices and, most of all, the growth prospects of the 
largest trading partner in the region – the EU – influence the performance of numerous economic 
indicators in the Mediterranean region. Moreover, partner countries continue to be exposed to 
highly volatile climatic conditions which can have – in the short term – a strong impact on the 
outcome of economic indicators. 
 
There is also a considerable time lag with regard to the operationalisation of the Barcelona 
objectives. In the economic domain, the Barcelona process is driven forward by the conclusion 
and implementation of Association Agreements and, more recently, by the conclusion of Action 
Plans in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The first Association Agreements 
entered into force in 1997 and 1998 for Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority. The Association 
Agreements with Algeria and Syria still need to be ratified (Algeria) and fully signed (Syria). 
Once in force, the Association Agreements foresee a relatively long transitional period for 
implementation and full reciprocal trade liberalisation. This has repercussions on the speed and 
scope of a country’s overall economic path. Moreover, the benefits of certain measures, e.g. 
structural reforms in the field of competition, or changes in the institutional and legislative 
framework, only materialise in the medium term.   
 
 
a.) Change through financial incentives 
 
The EU’s MEDA programme is a major tool for creating financial incentives for reform in the 
Mediterranean region. MEDA I, which ran until 1999, provided project financing worth over 
EUR 3.4 billion. About 45% of the funds were allocated to projects in support of economic 
transition, private sector development and support for structural adjustment. Under MEDA II, 
scheduled for the period from 2000 until 2006 with a budget of EUR 5.35 billion, free trade and 
economic reforms remain at the core of Community financial support. The main priorities of 
MEDA II are to assist the Mediterranean partners to implement free trade with the EU and to 
achieve sustainable economic growth through macroeconomic and structural reforms. MEDA 
                                                 
39 DIFD, “European Neighbourhood Policy: Enhancing Prospects for Reform in Mashreq Countries”, unpublished 
discussion paper. Maybe: Emerson M. and G. Noutcheva (2005), “From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood 
Policy – Assessment and Open Issues”, CEPS Working Document, No. 220, March. 
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resources are also targeted at alleviating the negative effects which this process may have on the 
most vulnerable groups of society.  
 
The grants from the MEDA Community budget are complemented by lending operations from 
the European Investment Bank (EIB).40 The Bank has provided loans of about EUR 9 billion to 
the region. A Euro-Mediterranean Investment Facility (FEMIP) was set up within the EIB, which 
started to operate in September 2002 and was officially launched in October 2002. A further 
EUR 8-10 billion in loans was offered to the Mediterranean partners under the terms of this 
facility up to 2006. FEMIP encompasses all EIB lending operations in the Mediterranean with 
the principal aim of promoting private sector development. It also provides MEDA-funded risk 
capital and technical assistance to support investment projects. 
 
 
b. Change through policy dialogue 
 
As for socialisation, the Association Agreements concluded with Mediterranean partners 
established a rich bilateral institutional framework for the implementation of respective 
commitments. This framework includes the Association Council (Ministerial), the highest 
political body, and provides political guidelines for the future of the relationship between the 
partner countries and the EU. The Association Committee (senior official level) prepares the 
Association Council and acts as an arbitrator for unresolved issues within working groups. The 
work at the technical level is split up into a number of working groups. Regional Euro-
Mediterranean dialogues on political, economic and cultural fields complement the bilateral 
activities and represent one of the most innovative aspects of the partnership.  
 
In the economic area, “Economic Dialogues” between the European Commission and the 
authorities of the partner countries take place periodically to complement the permanent dialogue 
by EC Delegations in the region. Since the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
the role of the Economic Dialogues includes monitoring the Action Plan implementation with 
regard to macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms. The EC Delegations, present in all 
Mediterranean countries, have a regular exchange of views on economic issues with the local 
administration in the context of implementation of the National Indicative Programme which 
defines the EU’s individual financial aid measures and, where already available, the Action Plan. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Source: http://www.eib.org/. 
